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   by 
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CHAIRPERSON, NATIONAL CRIME AUTHORITY 
       MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA
1. Introduction
   Throughout much of the last quarter of the 20th Century , the subject of 
organised crime has been an issue at both the political level and within the 
law enforcement community in Australia . There have been a number of 
inquiries which have sought to ascertain the nature of the problem , its un-
derlying causes and the best way to deal with the problem . 
   In a federal jurisdiction there are particular problems which arise be -
cause bodies created by the national Parliament cannot deal with matters of 
State responsibility and vice versa . It requires a comprehensive and coop-
erative effort from all jurisdictions to satisfactorily address the issues . 
   The National Crime Authority (NCA) is the organisation which has 
been created to address these issues in Australia . This paper outlines the 
powers and functions of the NCA, its relationship with other law enforce-
ment agencies in Australia and overseas , the nature and extent of organised 
crime within Australia and analyses the NCA's successes over the last de -
cade. 
   With this background, a number of suggestions are made as to the way 
in which investigative agencies might address the problem of organised 
crime, including the kind of  Iegislative framework which might be appro-
priate and the powers and functions which have been found necessary to 
deal with these issues in Australia. 
   The NCA's mission is to counter organised crime (particularly activi-
ties and structures which extend beyond individual jurisdictions) , and re-
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duce its impact on the Australian community, working in cooperation and 
partnership with other agencies. In doing so, the NCA aims to effectively 
disrupt current organised criminal activity in Australia and to prevent and 
deter future organised criminal activity. To achieve this, the NCA has adopted 
a number of strategies; one of the most effective is that of working in close 
partnership with other agencies to increase the effectiveness of all Austra-
lian law enforcement's operations against organised crime. Importantly, as 
a national agency, the NCA also has a strong commitment to contributing 
to national and international dialogue on organised crime issues. 
   The NCA is a unique organisation within the law enforcement com-
munity in Australia. Under the National Crime Authority Act 1984 it has a 
number of coercive powers, including the ability to compel people to pro-
duce documents and to appear before the Authority to give sworn evidence. 
Such powers are not available to traditional police forces. The NCA has a 
national as well as a multi jurisdictional focus and can investigate offences 
against Federal as well as State and Territory laws. The NCA can, more-
over, use facilities such as telephone interception and listening devices. These 
investigative tools are only available after a judicial warrant has been ob-
tained under the relevant Federal and State or Territory legislation. 
    The NCA is not, however, a police service; rather, it is an investigative 
agency which utilises multi-disciplinary teams of police, financial investi-
gators, lawyers, intelligence analysts and support staff to investigate 
organised crime. The multi jurisdictional focus, the multi-disciplinary team 
structure and the use of coercive powers has enabled the NCA to conduct 
national operations, in cooperation with other agencies, against major areas 
of organised crime. 
             2. The Establishment of the NCA
   The decision to establish the NCA was prompted by calls for the cre-
ation of a national body to combat organised criminal activity (following 
the findings of several Royal Commissions held during the mid-1970s). 
The work of these Royal Commissions brought to public attention the 
realisation that Australian law enforcement agencies were often ill-equipped 
to deal with organised crime, and that jurisdictional limits had significantly 
impaired the ability of individual police forces to attack criminal 
organisations which operated across State/Territory (and even national) 
borders. 
   Since it was generally agreed that the success of the various Royal
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 Commissions in uncovering organised crime had been largely due to their 
 power to summons documents and witnesses, their use of personnel with 
 specialist training and professional expertise and access to sophisticated 
 intelligence gathering Systems , it was perceived that if a national body were 
to be set up, it should be a continuing agency with these types of coercive 
powers and investigative resources. As a result, the National Crime Au-
thority was established on 1 July 1984. 
    The NCA is national in more than name only in that it is created by a 
Commonwealth Act and underpinning legislation from all States and Terri -
tories. The Act is a product of many compromises which seek to strike a 
balance between the liberties of the individual and the greater good of the 
community especially in relation to the inherent difficulties in combating 
organised crime. In the 12 years since its enactment we have learnt many 
lessons and now realise the traditional concepts of combating organised 
crime as they existed in 1984 need significant adjusting . For example, at the 
time the NCA was established it was generally accepted that one came across 
some form of criminal activity and then traced it to its perpetrators . This 
was, and still is, the traditional police model . Police forces investigate known 
criminality to identify offenders , arrest them and bring them to trial. If the 
Authority uncovered criminal activity that was relevant criminal activity 
for the purposes of the Act , a reference could be obtained from the Inter-
Governmental Committee (IGC) and a special investigation could be com-
menced. 
   There was a general expectation that specific kinds of criminal activity 
or the suspected criminal activities of a particular criminal organisation would 
be identified in a reference. However , as you will see, many of our most 
significant successes are as a result of examining monetary transactions 
which will often identify the receiver of such monies but not the criminality 
in which it is involved. It is only after painstaking investigation that is costly 
in terms of both time and resources that the relevant criminal activity can be 
identified. This has caused many problems with the drafting of appropriate 
references and the time has come to carry out some appropriate amend -
ments to the Act to ensure that there is no ambiguity in relation to the refer -
ence provisions. This is an issue I will return to later . 
   So how does the Act work? The Act sets up a scheme of statutory 
checks and balances. At all times the NCA can carry on general investiga -
tions into organised crime but it cannot use its coercive powers in relation 
to such investigations. The Act itself does not actually refer to "organised
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crime" but states that one of the functions of the Authority is to investigate 
relevant "criminal activity" which are offences which: 
   • involve two or more offenders and substantial planning and 
    organisation; 
   • use sophisticated methods and techniques; 
   • are of the kind ordinarily committed in conjunction with other like 
     offences and 
   • includes theft, fraud, tax evasion, currency and company violations, 
    illegal drug dealings, bribery, illegal gambling, extortion, violence, 
     passport forgery, armaments dealings and other specified offences. 
    It should also be borne in mind the NCA has other functions which 
     include: 
   • the collection, analysis and dissemination of information and intelli-
     gence relating to relevant criminal activities; and 
   • the establishment and coordination or a National/Commonwealth or 
     State/Territory Task Force (where appropriate). 
   In carrying out its functions, the NCA can exercise wide ranging pow-
ers, some of which are not available to other law enforcement agencies. 
There are, however, conditions under which these powers, particularly the 
coercive powers can be used. Legislative requirements specify that NCA's 
coercive powers may only be used in particular investigations known as 
special investigations.  These investigations arise from matters referred to it 
in the form of a reference (or specific mandate) from the Commonwealth 
and/or State and Territory governments. From time to time the NCA also 
conducts general investigations which also relate to organised criminal ac-
tivity, but which are not conducted under a reference". Under such circum-
stances, the NCA may establish task forces, but its coercive powers cannot 
be used. 
    If a relevant Minister of a State or Commonwealth considers that some 
relevant criminal activity is so serious that it requires the use of the NCA's 
coercive powers they can approach the IGC. This Committee consists of 
the Federal Attorney-General and the Police Ministers for all States and 
Territories. If the IGC considers it appropriate it will issue a reference to 
the NCA that empowers the Authority to carry out a special investigation in 
relation to the matters covered by that reference. Once the Authority is con-
ducting a special investigation it can use its coercive powers which include: 
    • the summonsing of witnesses to attend upon the Authority and give 
     sworn evidence and produce documents referred to in the summons;
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     and 
   • the obtaining by compulsion of documents from institution
s, espe-
     cially financial institutions, and requiring those institutions not to 
     divulge the fact that the information has been obtained from them to
     any persons including the person to whom the records relate . 
    A witness summonsed to appear before the Authority can only refuse 
to answer questions if they have reasonable grounds to do so . The most 
common form of such reasonable grounds is the fact that their answers may 
incriminate them. Much valuable information can be obtained from people 
already convicted of offences, especially drug couriers , who cannot refuse 
to answer questions on the grounds that it may incriminate them because 
they have already been convicted of such offences . Of course they still en-
joy the protection against self-incrimination in relation to conduct for which 
they have not been convicted. All hearings are held in secret and there are 
statutory prohibitions preventing the dissemination of information relating 
to the hearings or the fact that that particular witness has been summonsed 
to appear before the NCA . 
   The NCA has to report back to the IGC at regular intervals as to progress 
in relation to references; and the overall operation of the NCA is monitored 
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee (PJC) which is a Committee consist -
ing of members of both Houses of Federal Parliament from all parties . At 
present the NCA's defined area of work by reason of references and other 
government directions is as follows: 
   • the criminal milieu on Australia's east coast; 
   • organised criminal activity originating in Southeast Asia
, including 
     Chinese-Australian and Vietnamese-Australian criminal groups; 
   •  halo-Australian organised crime; 
   • Lebanese-Australian organised crime; Romanian -Australian organised 
     crime; 
   • criminal groups originating in the former eastern bloc; 
   • Colombian cocaine syndicates; 
   • the Yakuza; 
   • outlaw motorcycle groups; and 
   • organised paedophile networks . 
   The NCA has, in the last two years , conducted strategic intelligence 
assessments dealing with each of these areas on the menu of work . A num-
ber of general conclusions can be reached as a result of this work . 
   Organised crime in Australia tends to be far more entrepreneurial than
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was thought in the past. Its structures are far less rigid and, while there are 
clear signs that significant criminal activity is engaged in by people with 
common ethnic origins, it is not correct to say that there is any link between 
ethnicity and criminal behaviour (quite the contrary). Even in those com-
munities in which there are tight social and community links, criminal ac-
tivity often extends beyond these links, driven primarily by profit motive. It 
is also important that stereotypes are avoided, and that general assumptions 
about criminality within sectors of the Australian community do not cloud 
our understanding of the real nature of the problem. The level of criminality 
within identified ethnic groups is, in fact, less than the overall average for 
the Australian population. 
   Individual contact and networking between criminals appears to be 
expanding, both within Australia and internationally, (reflecting the multi-
cultural diversity of the Australian population, as well as the domestic and 
international vectors of criminality which have an impact on Australia). 
Moreover, the entrepreneurial nature of organised criminality in Australia 
has meant that organised crime is both fluid and multi-dimensional, with 
many organised criminal groups involved in a range of criminal activities, 
as opportunities present themselves. 
    At a more specific level it has been possible to conclude that a number 
of areas of suspected organised criminal behaviour have not developed in 
the way that had been predicted in the Commonwealth Law Enforcement 
Review Report in 1994. The well documented activities of criminal groups 
with their origins in the Soviet Union, but who have now engaged in activi-
ties in central and western Europe and in North America, do not appear to 
have yet reached our shores. The other groups investigated have also proved 
to be of greater or lesser interest after careful evaluation, but these conclu-
sions could change rapidly if circumstances altered. 
    What the strategic intelligence assessments of the menu areas do indi-
cate, however, is that a new approach is required in the way we look at 
organised crime in Australia. Common ethnicity within organised crime 
syndicates is just one aspect of a series of far more complex (and inter-
related) markets for illicit goods and services in Australia. What is required 
is an understanding of how these various syndicates interact (either in com-
petition or cooperation) within the illicit marketplace, and what strategies 
we can employ to disrupt or deter their engagement in these markets in the 
 most cost-effective manner. 
    The NCA, in partnership with the Australian Federal Police and the
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 Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence is currently developing a na-
 tional overview of the criminal environment in Australia . This assessment  i
s designed to provide an authoritative and comprehensi ve description of 
 the current criminal environment in Australia , as well as providing a con-
 text for evaluating and formulating national law enforce ment policies, pri-
 orities and strategies . Based on the ground-breaking work of this assess -
 ment, the NCA also intends to map and analyse in far great er detail those 
 areas of criminality which appear to have the greatest impact on A
ustralia  - 
 the illicit drugs markets - starting with heroin . 
    The areas of work I outlined above arose from a major review carried 
 out in 1994. The Commonwealth Law Enforcement Review examined the 
 Authority's work and its relationship within the national scene and made a 
 number of major recommendations to government . It identified these areas 
of work which it described as a "menu" and the Authority has pl
aced most 
of its effort into investigating these areas . 
    That is not to say that each of the areas of organised cri
me identified 
are seen to be of similar importance or even to exist in significa nt measure 
in Australia. Rather this was an identification at the time of possible areas 
of criminal activity which needed to be assessed and
, if appropriate, built i
nto our day to day work programme . That is what has occurred and our 
current emphasis tends to be in the area of major drug activity and i
n par-
ticular importations originating from South East Asia
, entrenched criminal-i
ty on the east coast and the activities of some motorcycle gan
gs.     Th
e formative years of the NCA were not easy and there was much 
jealousy and distrust amongst traditional law enforcement agencies towards 
the NCA. The NCA did not help itself by at times appearing t
o want to 
adopt a big brother role in relation to the investigation of 
certain types of 
criminal activity; but today cooperation between the heads of all relevant 
Commonwealth law enforcement agencies is extremely good . Unfortunately 
many of the old habits are taking a long time to wear off and traditi
onal j
ealousies still exist throughout all the organisations although th
ankfully in 
rapidly diminishing quantities . 
   There is now widespread acceptance that we can best achieve our role b
y value adding to other traditional law enforcement agencies by the use of 
our coercive powers and special skills . 
        3. Structure, Functions and Powers of the NCA 
   The NCA comprises "the Authority" (the Chairperson and th e two
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Members), and approximately 350 members of staff (seconded police, law-
yers, financial and intelligence analysts, etc.). While the Chairperson and 
the Members have a corporate and collegiate responsibility for the NCA, 
neither the Chairperson, nor the Members actually exercise a direct man-
agement role over the particular regional office in which they are located. 
    Instead, the senior management of the NCA consists of two General 
Managers, who exercise functional responsibility for operations and corpo-
rate services. In addition, Regional Directors are charged with responsibil-
ity for overseeing the day to day management of the NCA's five regional 
offices, located in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth. The 
structure of the NCA requires both a flexible organisational approach, and a 
high degree of contact and cohesion between staff and management, to en-
able the ready deployment of staff between operational areas to satisfy com-
mon operational objectives.
Use of the Special Powers 
   During 1994-95, the NCA examined 180 witnesses at hearings con-
ducted under section 28 of the Act. When compared to the NCA's other 
powers, and traditional information collection techniques (including searches 
of public records and cultivating informants), hearings have proved to be an 
effective use of resources. They tend to be a highly focussed technique for 
obtaining information which cannot often be obtained through alternative 
or conventional processes. 
    Information obtained during the hearings process has assisted in pros-
ecutions, contributed to determining the course of investigations, has gen-
erated additional strategic and tactical intelligence, and has also been dis-
seminated to other organisations (such as the Australian Taxation Office) 
for their own purpose. During the same period, the Authority issued over 
700 notices to produce documents under section 29 of the Act, and these 
notices are proving valuable in the investigation of financial crime, particu-
larly money laundering. Material obtained through hearings or by the no-
tices to produce can only be passed on to other agencies in accordance with 
specific provisions in the NCA Act which determine the extent that infor-
mation can be disseminated to other agencies. 
             4. Relationship with Other Agencies 
    While the NCA has wide ranging powers and responsibilities, it is only 
 a small organisation within a much broader law enforcement environment
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(for example, NCA staff represent less than one percent of Australia's total 
law enforcement resources) . The NCA recognises , however, that it operates 
in a rapidly changing environment and if it is to remain responsiv e to cur-
rent developments and meet the emerging challenges from an evolving crimi-
nal milieu, it must continue to promote strategic alliances with other agen-
cies. This approach was endorsed by the Commonwealth Law Enforce ment 
Review Report. 
   The NCA has cooperative arrangements with all the Australian police 
services, and with a range of Commonwealth and State/Territory age ncies, 
and the NCA relies on this cooperation to provide it with relevant inform a-
tion and documents . Cooperation takes many forms and may include meet -
ings, dissemination of information , providing assistance to agencies and 
working together on joint investigations . The NCA has also developed rela-
tionships with overseas agencies , into the maintenance of which it puts con-
siderable effort, with the particular aim of promoting cooperation and liai-
son.
      5. Strategies to Meet the Challenges Facing the NCA 
        in Combating Organised Crime 
    Cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agencies in 
areas like the investigation of major organised crime is , as we all know, 
complex and difficult. Knowledge , trust and understanding are necessary 
for agencies to commit substantial resources to relatively long term projects 
with sometimes uncertain  outcomes . Different law enforcement agencies 
understandably have different priorities , and resources are scarce, and have 
to be balanced against public expectations and increased scrutiny of perfor -
mance. 
    Moreover, an increasing number of regulatory agencies are expanding 
their law enforcement role and the limited resources such agencies have to 
expend on enforcement means that organisations become increasingly re-
luctant to commit to projects they may not have much control over
, or fear 
may compete with their own interests . Obviously, it is not an easy environ-
ment in which to operate , and the challenges that exist are unlikely to di-
minish. 
   Past experience has taught the NCA that , while cooperation is an ef-
fective strategy, we need to improve the effectiveness of such an approach 
and to ensure its relevance to individual agencies . In doing so, the NCA and 
partner agencies have had to develop structures and procedures which en-
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able all to participate in setting priorities for work undertaken collectively. 
Time must therefore be taken by each agency to consider the costs and 
difficulties, and to ensure that these do not outweigh the expected outcomes 
and benefits. 
   The NCA and partner agencies now realise that it is fundamental to 
reach a certain level of agreement and commitment at the outset. These 
agreements must articulate the level of each agency's support, the common 
high priority attached to these cooperative ventures and that the best chance 
of success is likely to come from a coordinated and cooperative effort. It is 
also critical that once a commitment to a joint project is in place that all 
agencies are adequately informed about the progress and direction of all 
joint ventures. 
   Perhaps in the past it has been simply assumed that successful coop-
eration flows once a commitment in made. Experience has shown, how-
ever, that one needs to work consistently at the processes of cooperation. 
Indeed differences between and even within agencies in priorities, cultures 
and even personalities must be heeded. Cohesion and cooperation cannot 
be taken for granted, particularly in large national operations, and are espe-
cially important to the investigation of money laundering. 
6. Combating Organised Crime: Money Laundering 
    In recent years there has been an increasing international dimension to 
organised crime and this is reflected in the growth of money laundering 
which has become a global phenomenon. While we cannot accurately de-
termine how much money is laundered each year, the scale of the problem 
is believed to be huge. For example, when the Paris-based Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) issued its first report in 1990, it 
estimated that as much as $US85 billion a year in proceeds from drug traf-
ficking in the US and Europe alone could be available for laundering and 
 investment. If these estimates are accurate money laundering has clearly 
 reached such proportions that it is capable of affecting the economies and 
 governments of some countries. 
    The NCA believes that targeting organised crime syndicates through 
 the identification of large scale money laundering activity is a highly effec-
 tive strategy for counteracting and disrupting organised crime in Australia. 
 Investigating the financial affairs of these groups in Australia (and around 
 the world), leading in the most successful cases to confiscation of their fi-
 nancial base, is one of the most effective tools that law enforcement agen-
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 cies have in suppressing their activities , Nonetheless, law enforcement agen-
 cies alone cannot hope to combat the growing stem of money laund ering 
 schemes. 
    Australia is fortunate in having a highly advanced system of financial 
 transaction reporting and analysis . Our law enforcement agencies also ben-
 efit from sophisticated Commonwealth and State proceeds of crime and 
 anti-money laundering legislation , bilateral international treaties providing 
 mutual assistance in criminal matters and a new Commonwealth Evide nce 
 Act. Moreover, sophisticated taxation , customs and corporate and securi-
 ties industry regulators exist , and effective overseas liaison is provided by 
 the Australian Federal Police's 15 liaison offices in  14 different countries. 
    Nevertheless, money laundering remains of great concern . Australia's 
financial transaction reporting agency , AUSTRAC, commissioned a report 
(published in September 1995), estimating the extent of money laundering 
in Australia. Tentative conclusions indicated that " ... a range of between 
$1,000 and $4,500 million [is likely to be laundering in and through Austra -
lia] ... with perhaps some confidence that the most likely figure is around 
$3,500 million..." 
    So how has the NCA and its partners sought to tackle this problem? B
y using the NCA's coercive powers (under its generic money launde ring ref-
erences) in a cooperative rather than an exclusive way . The NCA has sought 
to involve and work jointly with other agencies to identify and devel op 
opportunities to target major organised criminal enterprises throu
gh their 
money laundering components . In doing so, it uses suspect financial activ -
ity reported to AUSTRAC by banks and other cash dealers , as a key indica-
tor of money laundering schemes . 
    Under its national task force arrangements , the NCA combines these 
capabilities in a coordinated attack against major organised crime syndi -
cates at their most vulnerable point - their financial base . Through the use 
of the coercive powers granted under NCA references , we have established 
strategic alliances with other agencies which have extended their own in-
vestigative capabilities . As a result, we are able to investigate any suspect 
financial activity, particularly that which may be associated with the large -
scale money laundering that underlies organised criminal enterprises . These 
task force arrangements have achieved significant successes through the 
cooperative efforts of participating agencies . 
   These successful cooperative arrangements have not , however, been 
restricted to Australia: the NCA and its Australian partners have worked
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with law enforcement agencies in other international jurisdictions to com-
bat organised criminal activities and money laundering. In Operation En-
dure, for example, an international heroin trafficking syndicate laundered 
more than $100 million through more than 300 false name accounts with 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce in Hong Kong, before investing it in 
various countries around the world, including Australia. The investigation 
of suspect real estate transactions in Australia led to the arrest of one of the 
key players, Tommy LAW Kin-man in Hong Kong, and helped facilitate 
the confiscation of more than $40 million of the syndicate's funds in both 
Hong Kong and Australia. These investigations involved the cooperation 
of Australian, US, and Hong Kong law enforcement and other agencies. 
              7. The NCA since Its Inception 
    The NCA has enjoyed mixed success. In its early years it was success-
ful in achieving large numbers of arrests and subsequent convictions. Its 
focus was primarily in the area of drugs, violence, extortion, fraud and "gang-
land" activity. Largely as a result of major corporate collapses towards the 
end of the 1980s there was a significant shift in the focus of Australian law 
enforcement towards corporate or "white collar" crime and the NCA under-
took a number of investigations in this area. These were of necessity long, 
complex and expensive. 
    In more recent years the Authority has again directed its work towards 
more traditional areas of organised criminal activity. It has also, most im-
portantly, built bridges to many other agencies in Australia and works in 
 much closer partnership arrangements. Its results have reflected the ben-
 efits of  these relationships. 
    The NCA's current focus is in areas of Asian organised crime, taxa-
 tion fraud and money laundering activities necessarily involved with 
 organised crime. 
S. A Different Approach 
    We have learnt much during the last decade. Many of our assumptions 
 about the kind of criminality with which the Authority had to deal, the struc-
 ture of those criminal organisations, the powers and functions that were 
 appropriate to deal with them and the legislative responses that were neces-
 sary, have changed. For example, our proceeds of crime legislation was 
 based on an assumption that criminal proceeds were more likely than not to 
 be invested within Australia.
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   It was therefore appropriate and sensible to develop legislation which 
endeavoured to allow for the freezing and confiscation of assets. At least at 
the federal level, there was a view that such confiscation of assets should 
only occur after conviction for serious criminal conduct. Money laundering 
was identified as a major issue but the offence itself was linked to a "predi-
cate" offence. It was therefore necessary to establish the criminal behaviour 
in relation to which the funds could be linked before those funds could be 
confiscated and a prosecution for money laundering undertaken. Today we 
are seeing a different picture. 
   Often it is the movement of money itself which identifies possible crimi-
nal behaviour. Rigorous analysis of the material might give rise for a greater 
cause of concern and the need for substantive investigation. The proceeds 
of criminal activity are increasingly seen to be removed from the jurisdic-
tion and, often, very shortly after those funds have been obtained. This 
emphasises the need for international perception and cooperation and for us 
to re-evaluate the kinds of offences and legislative structures which we have. 
   As to the NCA itself, if one was starting with a clean sheet, it might be 
established in a different way. The need for a reference to outline the areas 
of criminal activities to be investigated before its special powers can be 
used is not a model which has been followed elsewhere in Australia. 
    For example, there are major agencies with regulatory or law enforce-
ment responsibilities in areas such as anti-trust, companies and securities 
regulation and banking and finance which can exercise many, if not all, of 
the powers of the NCA, but do so without the same constraints. 
    The major issue is whether the NCA's powers continue to be limited 
to those matters in respect of which a reference has been given. It seems 
strange, to say the least, that other agencies can use these coercive powers 
without the need for a specific reference while investigating regulatory of-
fences or matters subject to civil litigation, while the Authority is constrained 
in its investigation of what is accepted to be serious criminal behaviour. It 
is certainly the case that in Australia competition policy law has very exten-
sive penalties with a maximum penalty of $10 million per offence. But the 
civil standard of proof is involved and there seems far less concern about 
the protection of individuals or corporations involved in such conduct than 
there is in relation to the criminal offences which we investigate. Yet this 
has been the nature of the debate about the Authority's powers from before 
its creation. 
    Because we deal with criminal offences there has always been a view
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that the rights of suspected offenders should be very carefully self-guarded . 
I do not quarrel with this but there seems to be some lack of clarity in the 
debate which confuses the protection provided by the criminal Justice sys-
tem with the investigative powers and functions of bodies such as the NCA . 
Why, for example, is it appropriate to allow the employee of a major corpo-
ration suspected of price fixing to be the subject of a hearing in private 
without legal representation and with no protection from self-incrimination 
when our hearings are conducted with both the right to representation and a 
right to silence. 
    If it is felt appropriate to retain the reference process , then what does 
need to be clarified is the extent to which the Authority's powers under a 
reference can be used to investigate possible criminal activity . There is a 
debate at present as to whether or not the Authority can use its special pow-
ers to investigate possible future criminal conduct rather than actual con-
duct which has already occurred. 
   The legislation is ambiguous and yet it seems unlikely that the Parlia-
ment intended the Authority to be given a reference in relation to those 
kinds of criminal activity but to be circumscribed to only investigating those 
matters which had already occurred when the reference was given . Indeed, 
when one poses the question whether the Authority should be able to con-
duct "prospective investigations" the answer is invariably yes . What is clear 
is that in the area of criminality in which we are involved , the conduct is on-
going and it is necessary to conduct an investigation which recognises that 
reality. 
   There is no doubt that our capacity to conduct hearings and to obtain 
information through the notices to produce sets us aside from traditional 
police powers. These are intrusive powers and, particularly in the case of 
notices to produce, the person who is the subject of the notice may be un-
aware of this fact. 
   For this reason it is appropriate that the powers only be exercised per-
sonally by Members of the Authority. There has been some suggestion that 
such powers should be delegated to senior Authority staff . In my view this 
is both inappropriate and dangerous. What sets the Authority apart is that 
specific individuals are given significant powers and are subject to substan-
tial accountability mechanisms in the way they exercise those powers . That 
is as it should be. If the powers were to become commonplace then there 
would be no distinction between the Authority and other investigative agen-
cies. In every case in which a statutory authority in Australia has such pow-
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ers they are exercised by the holders of the statutory office . This seems to 
me to strike the appropriate balance between intrusiveness of the powers 
and the benefit of the investigative process. 
    Another area where problems have emerged, concerns the extent to 
which Authority staff can operate across Australia's various jurisdictions . 
It is essential in a federal system that a national law enforcement agency is 
not circumscribed by jurisdictional boundaries. The criminals are not lim-
ited and it is essential that national law enforcement can deal with offences 
irrespective of the jurisdiction to which they relate . 
   An example is an argument which has been run recently , quite incor-
rectly in my view, that because the Act contains a power to search and seize 
In very limited circumstances, the general powers avail able to police to 
obtain search warrants under State or federal law are not available to the 
Authority's staff. These kinds of jurisdictional arguments often take a long 
time and extensive resources to resolve. 
   Further, problems can arise when a State police officer, seconded to 
the NCA, exercises powers in relation to a federal offence. There are ques-
tions as to whether such people need to be given the status of special con-
stables and this can be removed simply by a provision to the effect that 
members of staff of the Authority can exercise jurisdiction under State or 
federal law. 
   A further area of limitation is in the release of information to other 
agencies. At the time the Authority was established there was great concern 
that information acquired through its special powers (that is hearings and 
notices to produce) should not be available to other agencies or even used 
in unrelated judicial proceedings unless stringent safeguards were met . The 
Act, for example, prohibits a member of staff, or a former member of staff , 
from being a compellable witness in any judicial proceeding other than those 
which arise out of an Authority investigation, if in those cases there is a 
general prohibition on compellability which can be overruled by the judi-
cial officer conducting the proceedings. This has meant, for example , that 
information of direct relevance to other proceedings may not be able to be 
used because of the secrecy provisions in our Act. 
   Different questions of balance arise in this area, particularly where the 
information that has been obtained was the result of a general investigation 
or did not involve the use of the special powers. One can ask why such 
material should not be available in relevant criminal proceedings or even in 
civil proceedings in which that evidence would be material?
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   On the other hand, if Parliamentary concerns remain that the use of 
such information would give rise to serious questions about the NCA's use 
of these powers then we should retain the powers but with limited use of the 
material so obtained. I am, however, aware of a number of specific ex-
amples where the limitation on the release of information raises serious 
questions of policy in relation to whether such material should be available 
to the courts. I think there are much stronger arguments where there are 
civil proceedings involved to prevent disclosure. 
   While the legal framework is, of course, important - it is essential that 
adequate powers are conferred on any body established to deal with organised 
crime - that is by no means the end of the story. Our experience over the last 
decade suggests that there are a number of factors which need to come to-
gether if there is to be an effective and efficient capacity to deal with 
organised crime. These factors include:
   A. Political Commitment 
   It is essential that the government of the day supports the work of law 
enforcement in dealing with organised crime. Real commitment and not 
rhetoric is fundamental. The government's capacity to provide the neces-
sary support exists far beyond its policy in relation to combating organised 
crime but also includes a preparedness to provide support facilities, such as 
the courts to ensure that criminality is properly dealt with. 
   B. Adequate Powers 
   These include not only the powers to conduct hearings and obtain docu-
ments but the capacity to legally intercept telephones, use listening devices 
and other electronic surveillance equipment. 
   C. Funding 
   You simply cannot carry out investigative work into organised crime 
without adequate funding because it is extremely labour intensive as well 
as a high capital outlay on equipment. 
   D. Public Support 
   It is essential that the public support the activities of those engaged in 
fighting organised crime. What tends to happen is that bodies are estab-
lished with a flourish and soon become of less public interest (often be-
cause the media loses interest) and this is directly reflected in political in-
terest and funding availability. 
   E. Cooperation 
   Law enforcement agencies cannot work alone. They have to work with
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each other and even with those agencies not directly involved in traditional 
law enforcement such as Customs, Taxation and corporate regulatory agen-
cies. 
   F. Partnerships 
   The best way to engage in cooperative work is to have strong working 
partnerships which are sanctioned by legislation to enable proper exchange 
of information. 
   G. Coordination 
   Particularly in federal Systems such as Australia, an agency has to 
take a coordinating role. This does not mean that it dominates the relation-
ships or even that it directs them. Indeed, our experience is that shared man-
agement models work best. 
   H. Jurisdictional Boundaries Must Be Broken Down 
   Again this is a more significant problem within federal systems, but 
increasingly it is international jurisdictional constraints which assist the 
criminal. The best solutions are those which involve links between agen-
cies in different countries supported by effective legislative capacity to pro-
vide mutual assistance in criminal investigations. 
   I. Complementary Legislation
   Areas such as money laundering and corporate regulation need to be 
the subject of adequate laws. Lax company structures and open economies 
with no regulatory trails make it so much easier for criminals. Of course, a 
balance has to be struck with the demands of legitimate commerce but law 
enforcement needs to ensure it has a place at the table in debating these 
issues.
     9. International Law Enforcement/Business Cooperation 
   Combating money laundering is not just a matter of fighting crime but 
of preserving the integrity of financial institutions and, ultimately, of na-
tional and international financial systems as well. Impediments to that co-
operation continue to exist, including a reluctance to report criminal activ-
ity because of the effect it may have on an institution's image (as the recent 
case with Sumitomo bank indicates). It is also possible that by reporting 
criminal activity to law enforcement agencies, financial institutions fear 
that they may lose control of the matter while, at the same time, there is also 
the perception that law enforcement simply does not have the resources to 
deal with the problem. 
   The law enforcement community has a responsibility to address these
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concerns, and to dispel some of the myths. But the financial sector must 
also do more to ensure that financial institutions protect themselves from 
criminal penetration. This is particularly important as criminal organisations 
appear to draw upon the expertise and knowledge of professionals to rein-
vest their funds in legitimate businesses or assets. While I am not suggest-
ing that the majority of business and professional people or financial insti-
tutions are providing their expertise in the knowledge that the source of 
funds they are investing are from less than legitimate sources, there appears 
to be little questioning of the source of such funds. If international financial 
institutions are to avoid national and international regulation, then a form 
of self-regulation is appropriate. 
   In Operation Endure, for example, the syndicate was the Bank's single 
depositor in Hong Kong - its best customer, and twelve operatives were 
able to generate about $US5O million per year from this enterprise. Laun-
dered funds were invested in the names of companies incorporated in 
Panama, Liberia, Hong Kong and Australia to name just a few. Solicitors, 
accountants, bankers, merchant bankers and other financial and business 
advisers acted for the group in numerous countries. Many appear to have 
had varying degrees of insight into the real basis of its astounding financial 
success. 
   Again, in Operation Flash, representatives of the Mid Med Bank of 
Malta were convicted and sentenced after an NCA-led investigation uncov-
ered schemes involving drug trafficking, money laundering and tax avoid-
ance. Three of the bank's representative offices were also suspended from 
trading by the Reserve Bank of Australia as a result of the involvement of 
senior banking staff in criminal activities. In this particular operation, in-
formation from AUSTRAC alerted the NCA to a series of structured depos-
its relating to off-shore transfers of $2.5 million to Malta, which investiga-
tions eventually revealed were the proceeds of trafficking in cannabis. 
   While the transfers were being processed through the Sydney office of 
the Mid Med Bank, the managers of Mid Med's representative offices in 
Sydney, Melbourne and Mackay were actively encouraging customers to 
invest off-shore in such a way as to avoid transaction reporting require-
ments. They assured customers that their funds would be hidden and no 
deposit records would be kept. In just three years of trading, approximately 
$16 million was transferred to Malta. The bulk of these investments were 
not declared to the Australian Taxation Office thereby depriving the gov-
ernment of considerable revenue.
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   The investigation has also prompted the Maltese Government to con-
duct its own investigation. The extent to which such schemes are being 
carried out by other such overseas representative offices in Australia is un-
known. But the NCA has taken the steps to alert Treasury and the Reserve 
Bank of Australia for the need to closely monitor the operations of these 
banks, 
   Increasingly, the trend overseas, has been for close working relation-
ships between central banks, financial policy-makers and law enforcement 
in relation to dealing with the problem of money laundering. From my own 
observations the British in particular seem to have developed a very satis-
factory "whole of government" approach to this problem with close coop-
eration between bodies as different as the Bank of England, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the police and the National Criminal Intelligence 
Service. There has also been a marked increase in the recognition by major 
international financial bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank that money laundering is not just a major problem in com-
bating organised crime but also a significant threat to the integrity of finan-
cial markets.
10. Electronic Commerce
   A great deal of work is now being done in Australia to identify the 
extent to which the rapidly growing potential for electronic commerce is 
making national boundaries redundant and, indeed, significantly weaken-
ing the impact of central banks. Notions of controlling the money supply 
through devices such as interest rate policy may be seriously weakened if 
major financial transactions can take place outside the control of those na-
tional regulatory agencies. More importantly, from our perspective , is the 
potential for electronic commerce to generate new ways for organised crime 
to operate. Not only do these systems provide the means by which the pro-
ceeds of crime can be moved around the world instantaneously but the trans-
actions can be anonymous and indeed these forms of commerce themselves 
may be very vulnerable to fraud. This will require extensive international 
cooperation to develop appropriate systems to deal with the issue and to 
reflect a global marketplace in which our legal system is still based on tra-
ditional concepts of nation and sovereignty which may not be relevant in 
the  21st Century.
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11. Conclusion
   Because organised criminal activity (particularly money laundering) 
is an international phenomenon, the response to it must embrace as many 
countries as possible, in recent years, both formal and informal cooperation 
between individual countries has increased significantly. Through mutual 
assistance treaties, Australia's efforts to combat money laundering and other 
organised crime activity have become more effective and better focussed 
(for example, the NCA has already made its first mutual assistance request 
seeking the extradition of a person believed to be significantly involved in 
heroin importation and distribution, and money laundering). 
   While the NCA has benefited from the considered application of its 
special powers, our experience has shown that national and international 
cooperation is one of the most important instruments in any successful at-
tack on organised crime. While the NCA has worked hard to develop strate-
gic alliances with its Australian partners in the law enforcement commu-
nity, it recognises that its most important challenges are yet to be faced. The 
NCA must now work towards creating a more comprehensive approach to 
combating organised crime, by convincing an independent and rather con-
servative financial sector to become more active in the regulation and moni-
toring of crime, and by developing stronger cooperative and mutually ben-
eficial arrangements with its international partners. 
   In addition, we need legislative approaches to organised crime which 
are innovative, yet which reflect concerns about the basic right of individu-
als and the key elements of our justice system. What we must do is to con-
tinually debate within the community the appropriate balances to be struck 
so that our legislative framework is consistent with the community's under-
standing of the problem and difficulties and the legislation which it wishes 
enacted. As the area of electronic commerce develops there will be whole 
new areas of potential criminality and challenges which we have not yet 
started to face. Cooperation between law enforcement, financial regulators 
and national legislators will be essential if we are to meet this challenge. 
Far too often our laws have failed to keep pace with social and technologi-
cal change. The spread with which these funds are now moving makes it 
more difficult for this to occur but even more essential that it does.
